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RETHINKING JUDICIAL SELECTION:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF APPOINTIVE
SELECTION FOR STATE COURT JUDGES
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
FRIDAY, APRIL 7, 2006
WHY WE SEEK REFORM
John D. Feerick*
I appreciate very much the opportunity to speak at this program
on what makes for a good appointive system.
My involvement with the subject of judicial selection comes from
two roles.  From 1987 to 1990, I chaired a New York State Commis-
sion on Government Integrity,1 which Peter Bienstock was the ex-
ecutive director of.2  Richard Emery, who is here, was a
distinguished member of that commission,3 which, when it con-
cluded its work, recommended the abolition of the elective system
for selecting New York State trial judges.4
The ideas put forward did not prevail at the time, certainly, in
terms of political change.5  I am certainly happy that the views of
* John Feerick is a professor and former dean of Fordham University School of
Law.
1. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Ethics Panel Is Treading Quietly, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1987, at D6 (referring to John Feerick as Chairman of the Commission).  For a
description of the Commission’s purpose, see Frederick A. O. Schwartz, Jr. & Eric
Lane, The Politics and Processes of Charter Making: The Story of New York City’s
1989 Charter, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 723, 881 n.585 (1998) (citing John D. Feerick,
Reflections on Chairing the Commission on Government Integrity, in GOVERNMENT
ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990S: THE COLLECTED REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK
STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY 1-14 (Bruce A. Green ed. 1991)).
2. See Cohen Hennessey & Bienstock P.C., Attorney Directory Listing for Peter
Bienstock, http://www.chblaw.com/pb.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2006) (detailing
Bienstock’s position on the New York State Commission on Government Integrity).
3. See Kolbert, supra note 1 (listing Richard Emery as one of seven members of
the Commission).
4. See Daniel Wise, Elective System Is Put Under Intense Review: But Suggested
Reforms Are Likely to Be Narrow, Voluntary, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 2003, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1067351016201 (discussing the
Commission’s “broad-ranging condemnation of the elective system and [recommen-
dation] for its replacement with an appointive one”).
5. See id. (stating that the Commission’s “recommendation was never
implemented”).
3
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that commission, Norman tells me, have contributed to his own
thinking on the subject, and perhaps that of others.6
More recently, I have been chairing a commission appointed by
Chief Judge Kaye with a mandate of promoting and enhancing
confidence in judicial elections in this state.7  When she asked me
to chair this commission in the fall of 2002, she said, “Don’t get
hung up with appointive systems and changing the elective system
and the idea of amending the New York State Constitution, be-
cause you know there’s no support for that.”  Finding out what we
could do to promote confidence in judicial elections was the task
and assignment of our commission, a commission of twenty-nine
citizens and judges—a lot of different backgrounds, from every
part of the state.8
We made a number of recommendations,9 some of which have
been adopted by administrative rule and by the Court of Appeals,
through its rulemaking authority and supervisory functions, with
respect to the court system.10  But many recommendations that we
made can only be implemented by the Legislature, and the Legisla-
ture has so far been reluctant to embrace any change in the elective
process, with one exception having to do with campaign filings be-
ing sent to a central office rather than having to search throughout
6. See John Caher, Cardozo: Fix Party Conventions to Fight Voter Participation,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 27, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?
hubtype=TopStories&id=1143207014197 (stating that Norman Greene planned the
Rethinking Judicial Selection Symposium to “take a broad, national look not at
whether the appointive system is superior to the elective system, but on how to devise
the best appointive system”).
7. See, e.g., Press Release, David Bookstaver, Dir. & Mai Yee, Assistant Dir.,
N.Y. State Unified Court Sys. Commc’n Office, Comm’n to Foster Pub. Confidence in
State’s Elected Judges and the Electoral Process (Apr. 16, 2003), available at http://
www.nycourts.gov/press/pr2003_08.shtml (discussing Chief Judge Kaye’s appointment
of the Commission to Foster Public Confidence in Judicial Elections).
8. See id.; see also COMM’N TO PROMOTE PUB. CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELEC-
TIONS, FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK iii-iv
(2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reports (follow “Feerick Commission
to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections, Supplemental Report” hyperlink)
(listing the names and cities of origin for commission members).
9. See COMM’N TO PROMOTE PUB. CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra
note 8, at 17-18 (listing the Commission’s recommendations).
10. See, e.g., JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2006, at 5 (2006),
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/admin/stateofjudiciary/soj2006.pdf (“[T]he Court
of Appeals last month approved rules establishing a Statewide system of independent
judicial qualification commissions, or screening panels, for all candidates for elective
judicial office.”); see also NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, FEERICK COM-
MISSION REPORT URGES OVERHAUL OF CONVENTION SYSTEM (Winter 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/publications/benchmarks/issue3/elections.shtml
(noting that the rules were based on “earlier Feerick Commission reports”).
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fifty-seven counties for information as to what is going on in the
elective process in the state.11
When Norman invited me to participate in today’s program, I
responded by email as follows (I’m not sure what was on my mind
when I gave him this response, but this is what I said):
“What would you think of a philosophical reflection by me on
the role of a judge in our society and why it is important to always
look at and try to improve the way we select our judges, notwith-
standing the enormous resistance to any change from public lead-
ers, political party officials, the bar, and the people themselves,
who do not vote in elective systems or get much involved in ap-
pointive systems, except for the various special-interest groups?
Everyone seems to have his own idea of reform, as I have discov-
ered, leading to no consensus or even any real attempt at consen-
sus, thereby keeping in place a failed system.”
I concluded my email by saying, “Are we tilting at windmills?”
Norman called me immediately and asked me to explain my
email.  I now do so.
I start with a personal reflection.  I have been a member of the
bar for forty-five years (and I suspect that I am joined by at least a
11. The Feerick Commission recommended that campaign finance disclosure fil-
ings for judicial candidates for all courts should be filed electronically with the State
Board of Elections. See COMM’N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS, supra note 8, at app. A (summarizing the Commission’s 2003 and 2004
recommendations regarding campaign finance disclosure, including the recommenda-
tion that “[c]ampaign finance disclosure filings for judicial candidates for all courts . . .
be filed electronically and made publicly available in a searchable electronic format
on a timely basis”).  This recommendation was adopted by legislation that took effect
on January 1, 2006. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6200.1 (2006); see also
KAYE, supra note 10, at 5 (“Last year, the Legislature enacted one important Feerick
Commission recommendation: all candidates for county and local elective office must
file their campaign finance reports electronically with the State Board of Elections.”);
N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, HANDBOOK OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCIAL DISCLOSURE 2006 i-iv (2006), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/
NYSBOE/download/finance/hndbk2006.pdf (listing electronic filing requirements).
The Feerick Commission also recommended expanding and revising the content and
format of judicial disclosure filings. See COMM’N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 8, at app. A (summarizing the Commission’s 2003
and 2004 recommendations regarding campaign finance disclosure, including the rec-
ommendation that “[t]he content and format of judicial disclosure filings should be
expanded and revised”).  The Chief Administrator’s Rules Governing Judicial Con-
duct section 100.5(A)(4) adopted this recommendation in an amendment effective
September 1, 2006. See 28 N.Y. Reg. 99 (Aug. 9, 2006) (to be codified at N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 100.5(A)(4)(g)) (announcing the section amendment and
stating that judge and non-judge candidates for public election to judicial office must
file a financial disclosure statement with the Unified Court System Ethics Commis-
sion “containing the information and in the form set forth in the Annual Statement of
Financial Disclosure adopted by the Chief Judge of the State of New York”).
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few of you) and have spent time in almost all those years on the
subject of government reform—ethics reform, campaign finance
reforms, voter participation reforms, judicial selection reforms, and
the like.  These are not subjects for the short-winded or for the
faint of heart.  I have noticed in all of those efforts the different
points of view that manifest themselves, the difficulty of groups
compromising deeply felt positions, the intense resistance by those
with political power to change the status quo and give up the ad-
vantages they believe they have under the present system, and,
most noticeably, the absence of a public groundswell in support of
specific changes.
Finding sufficient common ground to effect reform is certainly a
very elusive goal, in my experience.
Not too many years ago, after a highly public effort by the New
York State Commission on Government Integrity, which I made
earlier reference to,12 to achieve government ethics reform, I went
to Albany to meet with the speaker of the New York State Assem-
bly,13 and I asked him what problems he had with the commission’s
recommendations.  He said he had none, but the members of his
body were not hearing from their constituents about such subjects
of ethics reform.  In other words, there was no public pressure to
change the system.
He also observed that whenever legislators adopt reforms in ar-
eas of government ethics, they are inevitably criticized by reform-
ers for not going far enough, thereby receiving no credit for what
they did, or even worse, being positioned as not being interested in
ethics reform.  He suggested that there was very little incentive in
the legislative body to give leadership in such areas.
In my recent experience for the Commission to Promote Confi-
dence in Judicial Elections,14 with no mandate to move to an ap-
pointive system, I have received similar reactions to change, as I
have gone throughout the state—often with the commission’s very
able counsel, Mike Sweeney, who is going to speak later in the pro-
gram—to the reactions that I have experienced in the past:
• Some lawyers and judges have complained that the work of
commissions to study and promote confidence in judicial elections
do harm to the judiciary by their very creation, casting a negative
reflection on their work.
12. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
13. Speaker Mel Miller.  This reference is to a meeting between John Feerick and
Mel Miller that took place in Mel Miller’s Office in Albany in either 1988 or 1989.
14. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
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• Some see judicial qualification commissions as the first step in
a process to substitute a system by appointment, to which they
strenuously object.
• One or more groups, with systems of ranking judges in their
particular areas, have expressed to me the view that the creation of
an independent qualifications commission would undermine their
work, undermine what they do in terms of ranking judges.
• Lawyers who are familiar and comfortable with the workings
of the courts in which they practice worry over what change will
bring.
• Citizens are vulnerable to appeals that a change to an appoin-
tive system is nothing more than an effort to rob them of the right
to vote and place power with either a small elite group or a diverse
group with whom they cannot identify.
• Public office holders often are reluctant to embrace change,
sometimes contending that their mandate to govern includes a
right to choose people who reflect the prevailing philosophy or
point of view.
• Political party leaders see the judiciary as a way to promote
and reward political party involvement.
Then there are a multiplicity of groups with their own points of
view as to the ideal system, with the perfect becoming the enemy of
the good.
Pessimists about the benefits and chances of reform can be
found everywhere.  In my view, whatever we believe about any
particular system, we should all approach our democracy as re-
formers and agents for change, especially lawyers, who take an
oath to uphold and improve the law.  While some sit back and
praise what we all believe to be the greatest government in the
world, others, like Norman Greene—and many of you, obviously—
continually focus on not what our democracy is, but what it should
be.
The importance of programs like this one is underscored by the
fact that the framers of the United States Constitution and our
state constitutions made the judiciary not part of another branch of
government, but an entirely separate and independent branch.
They identified the judicial power as one of the three great powers
of society, which, in an appropriate relationship with each other,
would ensure a government that was stable, just, and enduring.
They saw an independent judiciary as fundamental to the rule of
law and a bulwark against tyranny.
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Late Chief Justice William Rehnquist described an independent
judiciary as one of the crown jewels of the nation’s system of
government.15
To assure the judiciary’s rightful place in the architecture of gov-
ernment, the framers of the Constitution carefully addressed in
their handiwork the subject of judicial selection, as well as threats
to judicial independence associated with tenure of office and judi-
cial compensation.  At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, they
debated over a period of months whether the President or the leg-
islature should appoint federal judges.16  In the end, as you know,
presidential nomination was chosen, in the belief that the executive
would be responsible, accountable, and also knowledgeable of
those with the qualifications to be good judges.17  Appointment by
a legislative or numerous body, as they had experienced in their
states, was subject to deal-making and other practices that gave full
play to intrigue, concealment, and partiality, and insufficient atten-
tion to the proper qualifications for the office.18
A combination of nomination by the President and, as a check
and balance, confirmation by the United States Senate, a smaller
body than the entire Congress, was chosen as the means by which
to select qualified individuals for federal judgeships.
The process, as we all know, is certainly not without its politics,
but it has remained a durable part of our federal system since
1789.19
State judicial systems have had a checkered history.  Like many
of the original colonies, New York began with an appointive pro-
cess, but its failings led to the popular election of judges in 1846.20
15. Symposium, The Future of the Federal Courts, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 263, 274
(1996) (quoting Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s remark that the idea of an indepen-
dent judiciary is “one of the crown jewels of our system of government today”).
16. See FED. JUDICIAL HISTORY OFFICE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2-5 (2005), available at http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf/page/constitutional_origins_pdf.
17. See id. at 3.
18. See THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, THE DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON: JUNE 5 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/debates/605.htm (imaged from THE DE-
BATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION IN 1787, WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON, A DELEGATE
FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (Gaillard Hund & James Brown Scott eds., Oxford
University Press 1920).
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
20. Luke Bierman, Preserving Power in Picking Judges: Merit Selection for the New
York Court of Appeals, 60 ALB. L. REV. 339, 342 (1996) (evaluating the possibility
that merit selection for the New York Court of Appeals was adopted in order for
various political actors to maintain influence in selecting judges).
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Despite efforts to do so at a number of constitutional conventions
here in New York, we have not returned to a system-wide appoin-
tive regimen for judges.  One notable exception was in 1977, when
the voters approved a constitutional amendment providing for the
appointment of the court of appeals by the Governor from candi-
dates recommended by a commission on judicial nominations, sub-
ject to confirmation by the State Senate.21
In my opinion, the catalyst for change was the Governor at the
time, Hugh Carey, who, in his campaign to be Governor, said to
Cyrus Vance and other leaders of the bar that, if elected, he would
give strong leadership to change in the system.  He delivered on his
promise.
As a historical note, in the selection of the state supreme court
justices, New York early adopted a system of direct primaries, but
then gave it up because of all kinds of problems with it.  It adopted,
instead, in 1922, a system of judicial district-wide conventions for
the nomination of supreme court justices.  In proposing such a sys-
tem, a special legislative committee of our state legislature said,
“‘[i]t is inherent in the functions of the judicial office that the office
should seek the man, and not the man the office.’”22
It is inherent in the functions of the judicial office that the office
should seek the man, and not the man the office.
Nominating conventions were seen as the way to do this.  That
system, as you know, has been found unconstitutional by a federal
district court judge because of its domination by county political
party leaders.23  The commission that I have been involved with for
the chief judge over the past several years has laid out, in a series
of reports preceding the decision by Judge Gleeson, similar conclu-
sions and findings with respect to the influence of political party
leaders in the system of the judicial nominating conventions in this
state.24
As this program occurs, the good news is that important changes
are taking place in New York through the leadership of Chief
Judge Kaye, but there is a limit to what courts can do administra-
tively and pursuant to their supervisory and rulemaking authority.
21. Id. at 346-47; see also N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §2.
22. COMM’N TO PROMOTE PUB. CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note
8, at 23-24.
23. Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d 212, 255
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 462 F.3d 161, 208 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 1325
(2007).  The Supreme Court granted review of Lopez Torres as this article was going
to print.
24. See KAYE, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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One major development, which I am sure has been commented on
in the program—or will be—is the adoption by the court of appeals
recently of a rule calling for the establishment here in New York
State of a statewide system of independent judicial qualification
commissions within each judicial district for full-time trial judges in
the state.25  That system is now being implemented, as a result of
that initiative by our court of appeals.
Those commissions will be charged with identifying and encour-
aging a diverse pool of candidates as judicial vacancies occur and
assuring that every candidate possesses the requisite qualifications
for judicial office.26  Because of separation-of-powers concerns,
these qualification commissions will not have some of the features
proposed by the commission which I chair, because legislation, and
only legislation, is required in order to make those features a
reality.
What the court of appeals has done, however, by rule, is both
historic and commendable, if not incredibly positive, in terms of
the reform process in New York State at this time.  With a single
exception, as I noted before,27 involving the filing of campaign dis-
closure statements, the legislature here in our state so far has de-
clined to act on proposals that are now before it from our
commission and bar groups and other groups with respect to public
financing of judicial races, retention elections, reform of the judi-
cial nominating convention, voter guides, and independent qualifi-
cation commissions.
I just would give one aside.  I had two experiences with two very
significant groups in the state that were critical about our commis-
sion’s recommendation with respect to voter guides.  I said, “What
problem can you possibly have with respect to voter guides?”  They
said, “They will cost a lot of money, and nobody will pay attention
to the voter guides.”  But that is not the evidence, as one looks at
the initiatives that have taken place in different parts of the coun-
try with respect to the recommendation of voter guides.  But that is
part of the context in which reformers must proceed.
25. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 150.1 (2006) (mandating the estab-
lishment of an Independent Judicial Election Qualification Commission in each judi-
cial district); see also Judicial Screening Panels Members Announced, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 9,
2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleFriendlyNY.jsp?hubtype=&
id=1170928969016 (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
26. See KAYE, supra note 10, at 5 (“These commissions . . . provid[e] credible,
independent local bodies to evaluate the qualifications of judicial aspirants. The rat-
ings issued by these panels will stand as assurance to the public that whoever ulti-
mately appears on the ballot has been found qualified for judicial service.”).
27. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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In my work for the Commission to Promote Public Confidence
in Judicial Elections, the public, at public hearings and focus
groups and in response to a public opinion poll, has expressed its
general interest in reform, although, as I have noted, there is no
widespread—I don’t believe there is—public outcry for reform, de-
spite all the scandals we have had.  There is no question, however,
from our public hearings and focus groups, that the public wants
and expects an honest and ethical judicial system, and, when they
have a case in court, a decision by a well-qualified judge.
Reform is so difficult because the specifics of reform are often
quite technical.  The public is easily persuaded that elections—cer-
tainly, when they have the right to vote—are preferable to appoint-
ment, believing they are more open and transparent and more fully
reflective of the democratic principle.  Yet what happened with re-
spect to appointment to the court of appeals in 1977 offers, cer-
tainly, some hope for reformers in the present context—not to
speak about the incredible impact of Judge Gleeson’s decision.
For those engaged in judicial selection reform, the words of
Elihu Root are instructive.  I quote:
There are no worse enemies of all attempts at improving the
machinery of government than the people who are always in a
hurry, who are dissatisfied if results are not reached today or
tomorrow, who think that if they cannot, on the instant, see a
result accomplished, nothing has been done.  The process of civ-
ilization is always a process of building up, brick by brick, stone
by stone, a structure which is unnoted for years, but finally, in
the fruition of time, is the basis for greater progress.28
As I read that statement again, I kept thinking about Elizabeth
Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, who, in the 19th century, made the
case, in New York and all over the United States, for the women’s
right to vote.29  But neither was present when that amendment to
the Constitution was added.30
Leadership from elected officials is important, but critical to the
shaping of leadership is the engagement of the public.  Members of
the legislature need to hear from their constituents, citizen groups
need to be active, and lawyers who are expert in these areas must
28. THOMAS SCHICK, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1915 AND THE MODERN STATE GOVERNOR 133 (1978).
29. See, e.g., Sarah Miller Little, A Woman of Property: From Being It to Control-
ling It. A Bicentennial Perspective on Women and Ohio Property Law, 1803-2003, 16
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 177, 193 (2005).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  The 19th Amendment was ratified in 1920. Id.
Elizabeth Stanton died in 1902. See, e.g., Little, supra note 29, at 183 n.36.  Susan B.
Anthony died in 1906. See, e.g., id. at 196 n.97.
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step forward.  An important component for change must come
from groups who have the expertise to understand the deficiencies
in our laws and are committed to improving them—people like
yourselves.  It must come from the organized bar.  Bar associations
can be tremendously effective, both in galvanizing public support
for law reform and in promoting reform within the highest reaches
of state government.  While the bar has many worthwhile causes to
promote, in the years to come, can there be any more important
cause to include among them than judicial selection reform?
But our most important agent for change is education.  The long-
term response to the challenge of safeguarding the independence
of the judiciary must be found in educating the citizenry about our
government, our society based on the rule of law, and the purposes
and work of lawyers and judges, for, as Thomas Jefferson said, “If a
nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it
expects what never was and never will be.”31
James Madison put it differently: “A popular government with-
out popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a pro-
logue to a farce or a tragedy or both.  Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own gover-
nors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives.”32
I conclude by mentioning that this May, our outstanding Chief
Judge, Judith Kaye, will convene a statewide conference, supported
by many groups here, as well as citizen groups, for the purpose of
developing methods, beyond where we are in this state, for educat-
ing the public about the judiciary and judicial elections.33  I believe,
through education, we have our best chance of moving the system
to, perhaps, where, we might find common ground, it should be.
Thank you very much.
31. See, e.g., Molly Townes O’Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Real-
ities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359, 369 (1997) (quoting LAWRENCE A. CRE-
MIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL 29 (1951) (quoting Thomas Jefferson)).
32. See, e.g., Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., A Legislative Measure to Augment the Free
Flow of Public Information, 8 AM. U. L. REV. 19, 19 (1959) (quoting HAROLD D.
LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 62-63 (1950)).
33. See, e.g., KAYE, supra note 10, at 5 (announcing the then-upcoming sympo-
sium).  The “Symposium on Enhancing Voter Participation on Judicial Elections” was
held at the New York State Judicial Institute on May 17, 2006. See, e.g., Joy Beane,
Judicial Institute Hosts Voter Education Symposium, J. N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYSTEM,
Summer 2006, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/publications/benchmarks/
issue4/votereducation.shtml (“More than eighty lawyers, judges, educators and civic
organization representatives participated in a May 17 symposium at the New York
State Judicial Institute that offered both a state and national perspective on enhancing
voter participation in judicial elections.”).
